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Abstract
In this paper it is argued that privatization is not the only alternative to pub-
lic ownership. Adopting the incomplete contract approach, it is shown that
partial privatization may well be the optimal ownership structure. While
in the standard incomplete contract model joint ownership is usually domi-
nated, it is shown here that joint ownership in the form of partial privatiza-
tion can be optimal since it mitigates the disadvantages of public ownership
(no incentives to improve quality if the manager invests or too strong incen-
tives if the government invests) and of privatization (too strong incentives
for the manager to reduce costs).
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1 Introduction
The costs and benefits of privatization are the issue of a lasting and con-
troversial discussion in public economics.1 The recent theory of incomplete
contracts can help to throw some new light on this important discussion.
The incomplete contract approach pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986)
was initially focused on the choice between diﬀerent ownership structures
in the context of privately owned firms. In this context, Hart and Moore
(1990) and Hart (1995) have shown that joint ownership is often dominated
and can hence be neglected when looking for the optimal ownership arrange-
ment.2 In the present paper the incomplete contract approach is applied to
the privatization issue. It is shown that it may be too rash to view pub-
lic ownership and privatization as mutually exclusive alternatives. In fact,
partial privatization, i.e. joint ownership, may well turn out to be the opti-
mal ownership structure, if the trade-oﬀs that have been emphasized in the
privatization context are taken into account.
It is often argued that privatization of public enterprises induces man-
agers to exert more eﬀort in order to decrease costs. However, some econo-
mists also think that lower costs may be accompanied by a lower quality of
public services that private suppliers deliver.3 On the other hand, propo-
nents of privatization think that under certain circumstances privatization
may not only lead to lower costs, but also to higher quality. In order to
clarify this discussion, Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) have recently de-
veloped an incomplete contract model. In their analysis privatization is the
only alternative to public ownership. In contrast, in the present paper it
is argued that a discussion of the proper scope of governmental ownership
should not neglect the possibility of partial privatization.
Specifically, in the spirit of Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), consider a
government represented by a politician or a bureaucrat, who wants a certain
1There are by now several books devoted to the issue of privatization; e.g., see Bös
(1991) and Vickers and Yarrow (1988). See also Shleifer (1998) for a recent survey article
and Schmidt and Schnitzer (1997) for a discussion of diﬀerent privatization methods.
2See Schmitz (2001) for a non-technical survey of the literature on incomplete contracts.
3For example, when the railway service is privatized, too many workers may be dis-
missed, at the cost of safety. When the mail service is privatized, too many post oﬃces
may be closed, which reduces the quality of the service in rural areas.
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public good or service to be provided. According to the incomplete contract
approach, the basic question is who should have the right to control the
non-human assets needed for production of the good. Under public owner-
ship the government has the control right, whereas under privatization the
manager of the privatized firm has the control right.4 Independent of the
ownership structure, the manager can exert non-contractible eﬀort in order
to improve the quality of the good (quality innovation) and to reduce costs
(cost innovation). A quality innovation is accompanied by increased pro-
duction costs, while a cost innovation is accompanied by a reduced quality.
However, these negative side eﬀects are suﬃciently small so that implemen-
tation of both kinds of innovation is ex post eﬃcient. It is assumed that ex
ante it is not possible to contractually specify implementation; only incom-
plete contracts that specify a fixed payment and an ownership structure can
be written.
If the government has the authority to implement innovations (public
ownership), it will always implement a quality innovation. However, it is
only willing to implement a cost innovation if it is compensated for the re-
duced quality through renegotiation of the payment. Hence, the manager
does not invest in quality innovation (since he gets no compensation for the
increased costs), and he underinvests in cost innovation (since he receives
only part of the renegotiation surplus). If the manager has authority (pri-
vatization), he implements the cost innovation, but he only implements the
quality innovation if the payment is renegotiated so that he is compensated
for the increased costs. Thus, the manager overinvests in cost reduction
(since he ignores the quality loss) and underinvests in quality innovation
(since he gets only a fraction of the renegotiation surplus).
Now consider partial privatization, i.e. joint ownership. In this case
an innovation can only be implemented if the government and the man-
ager agree, i.e. both of them have veto power. In this case both types of
innovation will only be implemented through renegotiations, and hence the
manager underinvests in quality improvement and in cost reduction. A com-
parison with public ownership (underinvestment in cost innovation; but no
investment in quality innovation) shows that partial privatization is always
4For simplicity, the agency problem between the rest of society and the agent repre-
senting the government as well as the agency problem between the owners of the private
firm and the manager are neglected.
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superior.5
Hence, in this scenario, in which only the manager faces investment de-
cisions, public ownership can in fact never turn out to be optimal. In order
to develop a model that can explain each of the three diﬀerent ownership
arrangements depending on the parameter values within a uniform frame-
work, a second scenario will be considered. In this scenario the manager still
chooses investment in cost reduction, but the government chooses invest-
ment in quality improvement. Analogous considerations show that under
public ownership there is overinvestment in quality improvement and un-
derinvestment in cost reduction, and vice versa in the case of privatization.
Partial privatization leads to underinvestment in both kinds of innovation.
Each of the three arrangements can be optimal, depending upon the relative
importance of the innovations.6
Even though the relevance of partial privatization is well-known,7 to the
best of my knowledge this possibility has so far not been considered in the in-
complete contracts literature initiated by Grossman and Hart (1986). While
this paper is most closely related to Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), it
should be noted that there are some further papers that link the issue of
privatization to contractual incompleteness, in particular Shapiro and Willig
(1990), Laﬀont and Tirole (1991), and Schmidt (1996a, 1996b), although the
focus of these papers is quite diﬀerent (they assume informational asymme-
5Note that this is in contrast to the standard incomplete contract model outlined by
Hart (1995), in which investment incentives under joint ownership can never be larger
than under separate ownership. The reason is that in the standard model investments are
‘selfish’, while here the manager’s investment in quality innovation is ‘cooperative’ in the
language of Che and Hausch (1999), i.e. in the absence of renegotiation it is of benefit to
the other party only. Even when the government already has veto-power, the manager’s
incentives can still be improved by giving him veto-power, too, since only then will the
manager invest in quality innovation.
6The reason that partial privatization (joint ownership) can be optimal in this scenario
is that (in contrast to Hart’s (1995) standard model) under separate ownership there can
be overinvestment, since e.g. the government’s investment in quality improvement not only
increases the government’s benefit, but also the manager’s costs. In the second scenario
investment incentives under joint ownership can only be smaller than under separate
ownership. But unlike in Hart’s (1995) standard model, here this can be advantageous,
since it prevents overinvestment.
7See e.g. Boardman and Vining (1989), Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh (1994),
Ramamurti (1997), Boubakri and Cosset (1998), and Matsumura (1998).
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tries).8 In the context of private firms, it has recently been pointed out by
some authors that joint ownership may be optimal under certain circum-
stances. Halonen (1995) shows that joint ownership can be optimal in a
dynamic framework when the players are honest with a small probability.
DeMeza and Lockwood (1998) and Chiu (1998) consider a rule for splitting
the renegotiation surplus that is diﬀerent from Grossman and Hart (1986),
which may also make joint ownership optimal. Finally, Rosenkranz and
Schmitz (1999) show that joint ownership can be optimal in the context of
R&D joint ventures if it is important to induce the parties to disclose their
know-how.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following
section the basic model is introduced. In Section 3, the first scenario is
analyzed. It is shown that public ownership is always dominated by partial
privatization if only the manager invests. In Section 4, the second scenario
is analyzed. When both the manager and the government face investment
decisions, each ownership structure can turn out to be optimal. A simple
example is briefly discussed in Section 5. Finally, some concluding remarks
follow in Section 6.
2 The basic model
AmanagerM can produce a good or a service for the governmentG. At some
date 1, the parties contractually determine the basic characteristics of the
good to be delivered and the payment P0 to be made from the government
to the manager at date 3. The contract also specifies an ownership structure
o ∈ {G,M,P}. Under public ownership (o = G), the government has the
right to modify the non-human assets used in the production of the good.
Under privatization (o = M), the manager controls the assets, and under
partial privatization (o = P ), both parties must agree to any modifications.
The manager’s production costs are denoted by C, whereas the govern-
ment’s benefit from consuming the good is denoted by B. If the parties
at date 3 exchange the good and the assets have not been modified, costs
and benefit are given by C0 and B0, respectively. However, at date 2 non-
contractible eﬀort can be invest in two types of innovations that can influence
costs and benefits. An innovation is a proposal to modify the assets used
8See also De Fraja (1993) for a related line of research.
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in the production process, leading to a modified good. The owner(s) of the
assets can decide whether such a proposal is implemented. Following the
incomplete contract approach, it is assumed that a contract on the modifi-
cations can only be written at date 3, but not at date 1, when they are still
unknown.9
In particular, at date 2 the manager (in scenario I) or the government
(in scenario II) can invest i ∈ [0, i] in a quality innovation that (if it is
implemented) increases the governments’s benefit by β(i). The quality im-
provement is accompanied by an increase in the manager’s production costs
that is given by γ(i). Moreover, the manager can invest e ∈ [0, e] in a cost
innovation that decreases production costs by c(e) and goes with a decrease
in quality that is given by b(e). Let x ∈ {0, 1} and y ∈ {0, 1} denote the de-
cisions whether the quality innovation and the cost innovation, respectively,
are implemented, so that benefit and costs are
B(x, y) = B0 + xβ(i)− yb(e), (1)
C(x, y) = C0 − yc(e) + xγ(i). (2)
It is assumed that implementation of both kinds of innovation is ex post
eﬃcient, i.e. β(i) ≥ γ(i) and c(e) ≥ b(e). Moreover, it is supposed that
all functions are twice continuously diﬀerentiable and satisfy the following
standard assumptions:10 β(0) = 0, limi→0 β0(i) = ∞, β0(i) = 0, β00(i) <
0, γ(0) = 0, γ0(i) > 0, γ00(i) ≥ 0, and analogously c(0) = 0, lime→0 c0(e) =
∞, c0(e) = 0, c00(e) < 0, b(0) = 0, b0(e) > 0, b00(e) ≥ 0. The time structure of
the model is illustrated in Figure 1.
9While this assumption is in accordance with Grossman and Hart (1986), note that the
theoretical foundations are still a matter of ongoing discussions (see Maskin and Tirole,
1999, and Hart and Moore, 1999). Recently, Tirole (1999) has advocated a versatile
approach and argued that the incomplete contract theory may be a useful shortcut.
10Notice that c(e) denotes a cost reduction and is hence assumed to be concave, while
the benefit reduction b(e) is assumed to be convex. While the assumptions are in the
spirit of Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, p. 1134), note that strictly speaking their set
of assumptions implies b(e) ≡ 0, which is not the case here (see Section 5 for a non-trivial
example).
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date 1 date 2 date 3
choice of
ownership
structure
o∈{G,M,P}
investment in quality
innovation (i) and in
cost innovation (e)
bargaining over
implementation
decisions x and y
Figure 1: The sequence of events
Total surplus is given by B(x, y) − C(x, y) − i − e. If all variables were
contractible, the parties would agree on the first-best solution that maxi-
mizes total surplus.11 Under the assumptions made, this benchmark solu-
tion is given by the (ex post eﬃcient) implementation decisions xFB = 1
and yFB = 1 and by the (ex ante eﬃcient) investment levels iFB and eFB,
which are implicitly defined by
β0(iFB)− γ0(iFB) = 1, (3)
c0(eFB)− b0(eFB) = 1. (4)
At date 3, the default values of the implementation decisions x and y
(i.e., the decisions in the absence of renegotiation) depend upon the alloca-
tion of control rights. Under public ownership the government can decide
whether or not to implement quality and cost innovations. Since a quality
innovation can only increase the government’s benefit, it chooses xG = 1.
However, if there is no renegotiation of the payment, the government is not
willing to implement the cost innovation (yG = 0), since it is accompanied
by a decrease in quality and hence in the government’s benefit.12 In the
11For concreteness, one can assume that at date 1 the government has all bargaining
power. It would then set the payment P0 such that the manager receives his reservation
utility (which is assumed to be zero). Hence, it is in the government’s interest to maximize
total surplus.
12 It will be shown that in scenario I the manager does not invest in quality improvement
under public ownership. However, this does not change the fact that at date 3 the govern-
ment would implement the quality innovation if the manager had invested (both parties
know the innovations; cf. Aghion and Tirole, 1994). This is to be contrasted with Hart,
Shleifer, and Vishny’s (1997) model. Moreover, it is assumed here that once the parties
are locked-in, the government cannot hire another manager from a competitive market to
implement the cost innovation.
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case of privatization, the manager has the authority to decide about x and
y. He chooses xM = 0 and yM = 1, because the quality innovation leads to
higher production costs which the manager is not willing to incur without
compensation, while the cost innovation reduces his production costs. Fi-
nally, consider the case of partial privatization, so that the consent of both
parties is required in order to implement the innovations.13 Then the de-
fault decisions are xP = 0 and yP = 0, since the government puts a veto on
cost innovations and the manager puts a veto on quality innovations. Note
that in the present context this is equivalent to saying that the cost inno-
vation can only be implemented if the government agrees (i.e., reductions
in quality, e.g. safety of the service to be provided, need the government’s
approval), while the manager is free to implement the quality innovation.
It is assumed that the parties are symmetrically informed, so they will
according to the Coase - Theorem always enter renegotiations at date 3 and
implement the ex post eﬃcient decisions xFB and yFB. Following the in-
complete contracts approach introduced by Grossman and Hart (1986), it
is assumed that the parties split the renegotiation surplus according to the
Nash bargaining solution. Let the default decisions under ownership struc-
ture o ∈ {G,M,P} be denoted by xo and yo. Suppose that the manager’s
bargaining power π ∈ (0, 1) does not depend on the control structure.14
Then the parties’ anticipated payoﬀs at date 3 (i.e., not including the in-
vestment costs) are given by
UoM = P0 − C(xo, yo) (5)
+π ([B(1, 1)− C(1, 1)]− [B(xo, yo)−C(xo, yo)]) ,
UoG = B(x
o, yo)− P0 (6)
+(1− π) ([B(1, 1)− C(1, 1)]− [B(xo, yo)− C(xo, yo)]) .
In order to characterize the investment decisions under the diﬀerent own-
ership structures, the two scenarios under consideration have now to be
13 Instead of joint control over one asset (or a set of assets), one can alternatively imagine
that two complementary assets are needed for production of the public good. Joint own-
ership or partial privatization then means that one asset is controlled by the government
and the other asset by the manager. In any case, both parties’ approval is needed in order
to implement an innovation.
14This assumption is usually made in the incomplete contract literature. As has been
pointed out by Hart (1995, p. 39), it would be too easy to obtain a theory of the optimal
allocation of property rights if it were supposed that the bargaining process changes under
diﬀerent ownership structures.
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distinguished.
3 Scenario I: One-sided investment
In the first scenario, the manager chooses both investment levels. Hence,
the investment levels under ownership structure o are given by
(io, eo) = argmax
(i,e)
UoM − i− e. (7)
Consider first public ownership. In this case the default decisions are xG = 1
and yG = 0, so that¡
iG, eG
¢
= argmax
(i,e)
P0 − C0 − γ(i) + π [c(e)− b(e)]− i− e. (8)
Therefore, iG = 0, and eG is implicitly defined by the first-order condition
π
£
c0(eG)− b0(eG)
¤
= 1. (9)
Under public ownership the government would implement a quality innova-
tion, but the manager anticipates that he will have to incur the increased
production costs without being compensated, and thus the manager does
not exert any eﬀort in order to work out a proposal aimed at increasing
quality. However, knowing that the government is not willing to implement
a cost innovation that is accompanied by a reduction in its benefit without
compensation, the manager anticipates that at date 3 renegotiation in order
to implement the cost innovation will occur. Since he receives only a fraction
π of the renegotiation surplus, the manager underinvests in cost innovation
relative to the first-best benchmark (eG < eFB).15
Consider next the case of privatization. The manager then chooses¡
iM , eM
¢
= argmax
(i,e)
P0 − C0 + c(e) + π [β(i)− γ(i)]− i− e. (10)
The investment levels are thus given by the first-order conditions
π
£
β0(iM)− γ0(iM)
¤
= 1, (11)
c0(eM) = 1. (12)
A comparison of (12) with the first-best solution (4) shows that the man-
ager overinvests in cost innovation (eM > eFB).16 The reason is that the
15This follows immediately from the fact that c(e)− b(e) is strictly concave and π < 1.
16This follows from concavity of c(e) and c(e) − b(e) and from the fact that b0(e) is
positive.
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manager always implements the cost innovation but disregards the fact that
it is accompanied by a quality reduction. The manager underinvests in
quality innovation (iM < iFB), since it will only be implemented through
renegotiation and the manager merely gets a fraction π of the renegotiation
surplus.
Finally, consider partial privatization. The manager chooses¡
iP , eP
¢
= argmax
(i,e)
P0 −C0 + π [β(i)− γ(i) + c(e)− b(e)]− i− e. (13)
The first-order conditions are
π
£
β0(iP )− γ0(iP )
¤
= 1, (14)
π
£
c0(eP )− b0(eP )
¤
= 1. (15)
The manager underinvests in both dimensions, since both innovations are
only implemented through renegotiation and the manager does not receive
the full renegotiation surplus.
As an immediate consequence of the preceding discussion, the following
lemma can now be stated.
Lemma 1 In scenario I, the investment levels under the diﬀerent ownership
structures can be ranked as follows:
iG = 0 < iM = iP < iFB, (16)
eG = eP < eFB < eM . (17)
At date 1 the parties agree on the ownership structure that maximizes
total surplus So = B0+β(io)−b(eo)− [C0 − c(eo) + γ(io)]−io−eo. The first
result says that in scenario I either privatization or partial privatization is
optimal.
Proposition 1 If only the manager invests, public ownership can never be
optimal.
Proof. Note that investment in cost innovation is identical under o = G
and o = P . Moreover, while investment in quality innovation is always
smaller than in the first-best solution, it is larger under o = P than under
o = G. Since So is concave in io, this implies that public ownership is always
inferior to partial privatization.
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Whether privatization or partial privatization is optimal depends upon
the parameter constellation.17 In particular, the following characterization
can be provided.
Proposition 2 (i) If the manager’s bargaining power is suﬃciently large,
partial privatization is the optimal ownership structure. (ii) Suppose that
b(e) = θb˜(e), where θ > 0. Then for θ suﬃciently small (i.e., the benefit
reduction due to a cost innovation is suﬃciently small), privatization is
optimal.
Proof. Note that investment in quality innovation is identical under o =M
and o = P . (i) If the manager’s bargaining power π converges to 1, the
investment eP in cost innovation under partial privatization converges to
the first-best level eFB (compare (15) and (4)), while the overinvestment eM
in cost innovation under privatization remains unchanged (see (12)). (ii) If
θ → 0, then the first-best investment level eFB converges to eM (compare
(4) and (12)), while under partial privatization there is still underinvestment
(see (15)).
To summarize, if only the manager faces investment decisions, public
ownership is never optimal. Under public ownership the government would
always implement a quality innovation without compensating the manager
for the increased production costs, and hence the manager would not exert
any eﬀort aimed at quality improvements. Moreover, while under privati-
zation the costs are lower than under partial privatization, the quality is
also lower, since under privatization the manager has too strong incentives
to reduce production costs. It may hence well be optimal to choose a par-
tially privatized ownership structure such that the government can block
cost innovations that reduce quality. In this case the manager’s incentives
to reduce costs are smaller and the incentives to improve quality are identical
compared with the case of privatization.
While public ownership cannot be optimal in scenario I once the possi-
bility of partial privatization is considered, in the next section a variant of
17Notice that privatization is not always the optimal ownership structure, even though
only the manager invests. While in Hart’s (1995) standard incomplete contract model a
non-investing party should never have veto-power, there are other papers which also show
that this may in fact be optimal under certain circumstances, cf. Rajan and Zingales
(1998) and Schmitz and Sliwka (2000).
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the model will be introduced that can oﬀer a rationale for any of the three
ownership structures.
4 Scenario II: Two-sided investment
In the second scenario, the manager still chooses the investment in cost
innovation, but now the government chooses the investment in quality im-
provement. This seems to be a plausible setting. Since the manager is
in charge of the production process, he is probably in the best position to
search for ways to reduce production costs. On the other hand, the quality
innovation aims at increasing the government’s benefit. There may well be
situations in which the government itself is in the best position to work out
proposals that may increase its benefit.18
The investment levels in scenario II are thus determined by19
io = argmax
i
UoG − i, (18)
eo = argmax
e
UoM − e. (19)
It is straightforward to see that the manager’s investment levels eG, eM , and
eP are still characterized by the same first-order conditions (9), (12), and
(15) as in scenario I.
In order to analyze the government’s investment in quality innovation,
consider first public ownership, so that
iG = argmax
i
B0 − P0 + β(i) + (1− π) [c(e)− b(e)]− i. (20)
Hence, iG is now determined by
β0(iG) = 1. (21)
18 In fact, most papers on the hold-up problem assume that the seller can invest in order
to reduce his costs, while the buyer can invest in order to increase her benefits (e.g., see
Hart and Moore, 1988, Hermalin and Katz, 1993, Nöldeke and Schmidt, 1995, Edlin and
Reichelstein, 1996, or Schmitz, 2000). See also the basic incomplete contract model in
Hart (1995).
19Notice that the default decisions xo and yo do not depend on who invests, i.e. they
remain unchanged. For example, the government would still implement the quality in-
novation under public ownership. Recall that implementation means that the assets are
modified by the owner. In the example this means that the manager cannot avoid incur-
ring higher production costs if the government implements the quality innovation under
o = G.
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Under public ownership the government implements the quality innovation
without renegotiation, but disregards the fact that it is accompanied by
higher production costs for the manager. Therefore, the government over-
invests relative to the first-best benchmark (iG > iFB).
Consider next privatization, so that the government chooses
iM = argmax
i
B0 − P0 − b(e) + (1− π) [β(i)− γ(i)]− i. (22)
The government’s investment level is thus given by
(1− π)
£
β0(iM)− γ0(iM)
¤
= 1. (23)
The government underinvests in quality innovation (iM < iFB), since it will
only be implemented through renegotiation and the government merely gets
a fraction 1− π of the renegotiation surplus.
Finally, consider partial privatization. The government chooses
iP = argmax
i
B0 − P0 + (1− π) [β(i)− γ(i) + c(e)− b(e)]− i, (24)
so that the first-order condition is again
(1− π)
£
β0(iP )− γ0(iP )
¤
= 1. (25)
The preceding discussion immediately implies the following lemma.
Lemma 2 In scenario II, the investment levels under the diﬀerent owner-
ship structures can be ranked as follows:
iM = iP < iFB < iG, (26)
eG = eP < eFB < eM . (27)
At date 1, the parties again choose the ownership structure that maxi-
mizes total surplus So. In scenario II any ownership structure can turn out
to be optimal, depending upon the parameter constellation. Specifically, the
following characterization can be provided.
Proposition 3 (i) Suppose that b(e) = θb˜(e), where θ > 0. Then for θ
suﬃciently small, privatization is optimal, if the manager’s bargaining power
is suﬃciently small or if the quality innovation is unimportant (suppose that
β(i)− γ(i) = τ [β˜(i)− γ˜(i)], with τ > 0 suﬃciently small). (ii) Suppose that
γ(i) = ψγ˜(i), where ψ > 0. Then for ψ suﬃciently small, public ownership
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is optimal, if the manager’s bargaining power is suﬃciently large or if the
cost innovation is unimportant (suppose that c(e)−b(e) = φ[c˜(e)− b˜(e)] with
φ > 0 suﬃciently small). (iii) If the adverse side eﬀects of the innovations
are substantial, partial privatization can be optimal.
Proof. (i) If θ converges to 0, then eFB → eM (see (4) and (12)) while
there is still underinvestment in cost reduction under public ownership and
under partial privatization. Moreover, if π → 0, then iM → iFB (see (23)
and (3)), so that o =M is optimal. Alternatively, if τ converges to 0, then
iFB → 0, so that again o =M is optimal. (ii) If ψ → 0, then iFB → iG (see
(3) and (21)), while there is still underinvestment in quality improvement
under privatization and under partial privatization. Moreover, if π → 0,
then eG → eFB (see (9) and (4)), so that o = G is optimal. Alternatively, if
φ converges to 0, then eFB → 0, and hence o = G is again optimal. (iii) In
order to prove the remaining part, it is suﬃcient to give an example. Such
an example will be discussed in the following section.
Note in particular that in scenario II public ownership can be optimal,
while it was always inferior to partial privatization in scenario I. The rea-
son is as follows. The manager’s incentives to invest in cost reduction are
always the same under o = G and o = P . Moreover, under partial privatiza-
tion there is always underinvestment in the quality innovation. However, in
scenario I the manager has no incentives to invest in quality improvement
under public ownership, while in scenario II the government’s incentives to
invest in quality improvement are too strong under o = G. In scenario
II it may well happen that the overinvestment in quality innovation under
o = G is less harmful than the underinvestment under o = P, so that public
ownership is no longer dominated by partial privatization.20
In the next section it will be demonstrated that the assumptions made
in this paper are consistent with non-trivial examples and that in scenario
II any of the three ownership structures (including partial privatization) can
be optimal for a wide range of parameter values, depending on the relative
importance of quality and cost innovations.
20Note that only in scenario I (in which public ownership is never optimal if partial
privatization is taken into account) can quality under public ownership be lower than
under private ownership (since iM > 0). In scenario II there is always a clear trade-oﬀ
between costs and quality.
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5 A simple example
Some of the main insights of this paper can now be briefly illustrated using
a simple example. Let the quality improvement be given by β(i) = 2i1/2− i,
and the accompanying cost increase by γ(i) = ψi. Let the cost reduction
c(e) = 2e1/2−e be accompanied by a benefit reduction b(e) = θe. Moreover,
i = 1, e = 1, B0 = 2, C0 = 1, and π = 12 . It is easily verified that all
assumptions are satisfied if ψ ∈ (0, 1) and θ ∈ (0, 1).
First, consider scenario I, i.e. the manager chooses both investment lev-
els. Figure 2 shows the total surplus under the three diﬀerent ownership
arrangements as functions of θ, holding ψ = 12 fixed. As a benchmark, the
dotted line represents the first-best surplus. Public ownership can obviously
never be optimal. Moreover, if θ is smaller than a certain cut-oﬀ value κ
(which in this example is equal to 12
√
17− 32 ≈ 0.56), privatization is better
than partial privatization.
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1.4
1.3
θ
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privatization
first best
privatization
public
ownership
κ
Figure 2: Surplus in scenario I
Second, consider scenario II, so that the manager chooses the investment
in cost reduction, while the government chooses the investment in quality
improvement. The example demonstrates that in this case each of the three
ownership structures can be optimal under certain circumstances. Figure 3
displays the optimal ownership arrangement depending on θ and ψ.
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Figure 3: Optimal ownership structure in scenario II
Since the manager’s incentives to invest in cost reduction are the same
as in scenario I, and since the government’s incentives to invest in quality
improvement are identical under privatization and partial privatization, it
is still true that partial privatization is better than privatization whenever
θ ≥ κ. However, partial privatization is only the optimal ownership structure
if ψ is large. If ψ is suﬃciently small (due to the symmetry of the example,
this means if ψ is smaller than κ), public ownership is better than partial
privatization (while the manager’s investment in cost reduction is identical
under both arrangements, the government’s investment in quality improve-
ment is near the first best for small ψ under public ownership). Finally,
if both θ and ψ are small, partial privatization is never optimal. Whether
public ownership or privatization is superior depends on the relative im-
portance of investments in quality and cost innovations (in the symmetric
example, if θ is smaller than ψ, so that cost reduction is more important,
then privatization is optimal).
6 Conclusion
A discussion of the proper scope of governmental ownership should take the
possibility of partial privatization into account. If only the manager faces
investment decisions, public ownership is always dominated by partial pri-
vatization, since under public ownership the manager has no incentives to
16
invest in quality improvements. But if the manager as well as the govern-
ment have investment opportunities, each of the three ownership structures
o ∈ {G,M,P} may turn out to be optimal. If cost-reducing innovations
are likely to be accompanied by serious reductions in quality, public owner-
ship may be desirable. On the other hand, if quality-enhancing innovations
lead to significant cost increases, privatization may be superior. Finally, if
the adverse side eﬀects of both kinds of innovation are substantial, partial
privatization may be optimal, since it prevents overinvestments.
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